Trans-generational transmission of traumatic memory and moral injury by Jones, Edgar
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/21635781.2018.1454362
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Jones, E. (2018). Trans-generational transmission of traumatic memory and moral injury. Military Behavioral
Health, 6(2), 134-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/21635781.2018.1454362
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
1 
 
 
 
Trans-generational transmission of traumatic memory and moral injury 
Edgar Jones 
Institute of Psychiatry Psychology and Neuroscience, King’s College London 
 
 
Abstract  
The scale of casualties in World War I and the reinterpretation of the conflict in terms of 
futility and waste suggest that many veterans experienced moral injury. Memory of the war 
was in part determined by their experience of the peace. Governments sought to contain 
traumatic memory through commemorative rituals such as Armistice Day and homage to the 
Unknown Soldier, whilst relatives were not permitted to repatriate the dead from military 
cemeteries on the battlefields. Despite gains in treating psychiatric casualties, many veterans 
with shell shock never recovered from their psychological wounds. To what extent their 
symptoms were a consequence of moral injury is not known, though individual accounts 
suggest that shame and guilt were features of their enduring illness. 
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During World War I, families who had lost a son or father on the battlefield observed the 
tradition of wearing dark mourning attire. Yet in 1917 commentators in France and the UK 
reported that people increasingly failed to mark the death of relatives in this way (Audoin-
Rouzeau & Becker, 2002). Either the bereaved were too numerous to have special value or 
civilians had become weary of continual reminders of mortality. The effect was long lasting 
and in the post-war period the tradition of mourning dress fell into progressive decline. The 
scale of casualties and the post-war reinterpretation of the conflict in terms of futility and 
waste suggest that many veterans experienced what today would be described as moral 
injury. Although the term was not used at the time, letters and diaries written during or 
immediately after the conflict reveal soldiers struggling to reconcile the demands made of 
them by the armed forces with deeply rooted beliefs about the value of life and the nature of a 
just conflict. How veterans remembered the war was, in part, determined by their experience 
of the peace. Governments sought to manage the effects of traumatic memory through 
commemorative acts such as Armistice Day, homage to the Unknown Soldier, the provision 
of war pensions and treatment programmes. As a result, transmission took place in a variety 
of modalities: private and public dialogue, literature and movies, memorials and state-
sanctioned rituals together with the direction of federal funding.  Taking World War I as an 
example, this paper will explore the expression of traumatic memory and its relationship to 
moral injury. 
Psychological trauma 
World War I taught the principal combatant nations about psychological casualties. In an 
extended conflict of attrition, they were numerous and of too great a military consequence to 
be ignored. By 1918, the larger European armies had extended systems of management in 
place: forward units to treat breakdown on the battlefield, networks of specialist hospitals in 
rear areas for chronic or severe cases and rehabilitation programmes for those no longer able 
to perform a role in the armed forces (Jones & Wessely, 2014). Civilians also began to learn 
about shell shock as relatives visited soldiers in hospital and observed its longer-term effects 
in the ex-service population. The scale of casualties required state intervention. In December 
1916 the Ministry of Pensions was created to provide welfare systems for veterans and 
families alike. Whilst the priority during the war was the efficient return of traumatized 
soldiers to active duty, the signing of the Armistice brought a new agenda: how to contain 
trauma and facilitate the transition to peacetime life. Frederick Mott, who had run the 
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Maudsley Neurological Clearing Hospital during the war, believed that the best way to 
resolve the force of traumatic memory was not psychoanalytical catharsis but active 
engagement in healthy activities to facilitate a natural dissipation. “Diversion of the mind,” 
he wrote, “should be encouraged to avoid introspection and dwelling upon the terrible 
experiences they [soldier patients] have gone through” (Mott, 1919, p. 270). Although work 
and social activities were considered therapeutic (Cohen, 2001), it was also recognised that 
some veterans had been so traumatized by their military service as to require specialist 
treatment. The Ministry of Pensions set up a national network of “Special Medical Clinics” to 
treat shell shock by out-patient psychotherapy. Case notes suggest that doctors encouraged 
veterans to report war dreams in the belief that the act of retelling would discharge the energy 
attached to the traumatic experience without the need for interpretation (Eshelby, 1924).    
 
Moral injury during World War I 
There is as yet no agreed definition of moral injury and this paper is based on a broad 
interpretation of term. Moral wounds of war are said to arise when a veteran feels that he or 
she has perpetrated, failed to prevent, borne witness to or learned about acts “that transgress 
deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al., 2009). Repeated thoughts about 
wartime acts of commission (particularly killing) or omission (failing to prevent atrocities) 
have prompted the description of a syndrome, characterised by guilt and shame (Frankfurt & 
Frazier, 2016). “Transgressions”, as Sherman has observed, “may be real or apparent, and in 
either case, can cause deep and real moral suffering” (Sherman, 2015, p. 174). 
 
Letters and diaries written by front-line soldiers during World War I reveal that some 
combatants experienced moral injury, largely because they found it increasingly difficult to 
justify the killing required of infantry soldiers. In July 1917, Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon of 
the Royal Welch Fusiliers sent a letter to his commanding officer, copied to politicians and 
literary figures, to register his opposition to the continued conduct of the war. He believed 
that “a war of defense and liberation” had become one of “aggression and conquest” fought 
for “evil and unjust” ends (1937, p. 496). Before this change of heart, Sassoon had earned a 
reputation for aggressive courage, conducting nightly patrols into no man’s land to attack 
German working parties with bombs and a revolver. At the Somme, he single-handedly 
assaulted a German trench, writing “I definitely wanted to kill someone at close quarters” 
(Egremont, 2005, p. 104). His exploits earned him a Military Cross and the nickname “Mad 
Jack”. Following a period of home leave, he increasingly believed that the killing was 
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unjustified and wrote that “prolonged campaigning… deadens all the fine and sensitive 
instincts of men” (Egremont, 2005, p. 123). The death of many comrades at the battle of 
Arras in April 1917 and his own wounding led to Sassoon suffer a form of breakdown that 
included an element of moral injury and he was referred to a specialist psychiatric unit at 
Craiglockhart. There his treatment by W.H.R. Rivers included discussion of war aims, the 
policies of European politicians and the dilemma they presented to an officer expected to 
return to the front (Sassoon, 1937, p. 521).   
 
Max Plowman, an officer in the Yorkshire Regiment, had also taken part in front-line 
combat and witnessed killing at close hand (Plowman, 1927).  At the outbreak of war, 
socialist beliefs had led Plowman to volunteer as a non-combatant with the Royal Army 
Medical Corps but a belief in a collective national responsibility for the conduct of the war 
led him to transfer to the infantry (Atkin, 2002, p. 109). Plowman fought at the Somme where 
in January 1917 he was concussed and invalided home with shell shock. Hospitalization gave 
him an opportunity to reflect on the war and its effects. His experience of artillery 
bombardments led him to conclude that they were not only futile but also a form of 
institutionalized murder (Plowman, 1927, p. 51). Plowman no longer felt able to participate 
in state-sanctioned killing and asked to be relieved of his commission.  He was arrested and 
tried by court martial in April 1918 for refusing to return to his unit. In the post-war period, 
Plowman achieved a measure of reconciliation by campaigning for a pacifist agenda, serving 
as the general-secretary of the Peace Pledge Union.  
 
Another infantry officer, Arthur Graeme West was so troubled by his experience of 
combat that he too sought to resign his commission and leave the army but was killed by a 
sniper in April 1917 before his resignation letter had been made public. Leave in the UK had 
given him the opportunity to re-evaluate his war service and led to “a violent revulsion of my 
old imagined glories and delights of the army” (West, 1919, p. 50). Combat, he argued, was 
“beastly and degrading” and could only be justified as “the gratification of senseless rivalry”. 
Having written the letter but not posted it, West returned to the front in a troubled state of 
mind: “I ought to fight no more…I am almost certain that I do wrong to go on” (West, 1919, 
pp. 54-55). Conflicted by comradeship and a sense of national duty, West was unable to 
resolve the moral injury that he had felt once removed from war zone. 
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Despite the emerging victorious from World War I, many British veterans felt an 
enduring sense of unease and struggled to reintegrate themselves into civilian life. J.B. 
Priestley, who had served in the 10th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, recalled a regimental 
reunion held in autumn 1933: “never have I seen a tavern stairs or a tavern upstairs so 
crowded, so tremendously alive with roaring masculinity... It is the peace that is wrong, the 
civilian life to which they [his comrades] returned, a condition of things in which they found 
their manhood stunted, their generous impulses baffled” (Priestley, 1934, pp. 162-63). 
Priestley had not objected to the conduct of the war but believed that the costs outweighed the 
gains: the trauma of military service had not been rewarded by educational opportunities and 
diversity of employment for most veterans. By contrast, he had been eligible for an ex-
officer’s grant which allowed him to study at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and launch a new 
career as a novelist and playwright. 
 
Initially, the Ministry of Pensions had been confident that it could successfully treat 
veterans with shell shock. Not only did it set up a network of out-patient clinics, the Ministry 
also opened ten specialist hospitals and by 1921 was treating 10,000 war pensioners (Jones & 
Wessely, 2005, p. 155). However, therapeutic targets were not met and in 1926 the Ministry 
concluded from patient surveys that ex-servicemen with chronic psychological disorders were 
unlikely to be cured.  Of the 65,000 war pensions for shell shock in 1921, 30,220 remained in 
payment in 1936 (Prideaux, 1936, Appendix 3). It remains a moot question to what extent 
moral wounds, and in particular feelings of shame and guilt, served to maintain or intensify 
shell shock and other psychological disorders experienced by veterans during the interwar 
period.  
 
Containing traumatic memory 
How veterans remembered World War I and contextualized the sacrifice was, in part, 
determined by their experience of the peace. In the immediate aftermath, Allied governments 
not only celebrated victory but also sought to commemorate the dead. In the UK, villages and 
towns raised funds to construct war memorials, which served as a focus of mourning during 
the annual Armistice Sunday service when a two-minute silence was observed (Winter, 
1995). The ritual was so designed that a pacifist and a warrior could stand together, each 
entertaining their different thoughts in an apparent show of unity. The Cenotaph, the 
symbolic focus of grieving in the UK, was originally a temporary structure of timber and 
plaster designed for a victory parade in July 1919 but after its removal the outcry was so great 
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that a permanent copy in Portland stone was commissioned. A poppy emblem, a symbolic 
link with the battlefields, sold by the British Legion to raise funds for veterans proved an 
important marketing device; 27 million poppies being manufactured in 1924. Although 
commemoration in itself did not bring psychological resolution for grieving parents, it was 
sponsored by governments to bring a form of cultural closure.   
 
Veterans were encouraged to attend the annual Armistice service and to wear their 
campaign medals to identify their military service. In the mid-1920s, Robert Graves observed 
that some ex-servicemen wore their medals under their coats to indicate comradeship with the 
dead, rather than support for the war itself (Graves, 1929, p. 260).  In the UK, one in six 
families lost a close relative so most who observed Armistice rituals did so from a sense of 
solidarity and support for those who had suffered directly (Gregory, 2008). Nevertheless, the 
number of bereaved was substantial: 240,000 war widows and 350,000 children who had lost 
a father in the UK, whilst in France the totals were higher, 600,000 and 760,000 respectively 
(Audoin-Rouzeau & Becker, 2002, p. 210).   
 
Historically, the British had buried their dead in military cemeteries on the battlefield 
or in the case of the Royal Navy at sea. In 1914-15, as casualties mounted, families sought to 
bring the bodies of sons and fathers home to bury them in ways of their own choosing. 
Conscious of the cost of repatriation and its potential impact on public opinion, the UK 
government intervened to give a geographical focus to trauma. From mid-1915 onwards, the 
War Office refused families permission to repatriate their dead on the grounds of equality, 
arguing that only the wealthy could afford the costs. Indeed, one of the few bodies brought 
home was that of Lieutenant William Gladstone, grandson of the prime minister, who had 
been killed in April 1915 and was buried in a family grave at Hawarden, North Wales.  
 
After the war, when permanent cemeteries were laid out, the Imperial War Graves 
Commission imposed a standard design of military headstone, denying the wishes of relatives 
to choose a site and type of grave marker. This policy contrasted with that for soldiers who 
died of wounds in UK hospitals. Families retained their burial rights and could choose how 
and where the dead were commemorated. The decision to curtail the rights of relatives was 
softened by creating graveyards that drew on British architectural and garden traditions 
(Ware, 1937). By contrast, the Trench of Bayonets memorial, opened in December 1920 to 
commemorate French dead at Verdun, was a minimalist structure of reinforced concrete in 
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modernist style. Its architect, André Ventre, sought to represent “tragedy and heroism” in a 
structure stripped of ornament to convey a sense of timelessness (Winter, 1995, p. 101). From 
the outset the British imposed an element of standardization and control. Although young 
architects who had served in the war were commissioned to plan military cemeteries, they 
were supervised by four principal architects (Edward Lutyens, Reginald Blomfield, Herbert 
Baker and Charles Holden) within an overall code of design (Ware, 1937).  
 
Names of British men whose bodies had been annihilated or not found, the so-called 
“missing”, were recorded on memorials constructed at Thiepval on the Somme and at Ypres 
(the Menin Gate, Tyne Cot and the Berkshire Cemetery). For relatives who had no tangible 
focus for mourning or who could not afford to travel to Europe, the government offered a 
different form of resolution. In November 1920, the body of an unknown British soldier was 
taken from a grave in France and interred in Westminster Abbey (Hunt, 2010). At the same 
time, an unidentified French corpse was taken from Verdun to Paris where it was carried on a 
gun carriage to the Pantheon accompanied by a war widow, parents who had lost a son and a 
child who had lost a father. The body was then buried at the base of the Arc de Triomphe as a 
permanent memorial. Such was the popular appeal of the ritual that it was adopted in 
Washington, Rome and Brussels in 1921. Although introduced to commemorate soldiers with 
no known grave, these memorials also offered symbolic repatriation for those families whose 
relatives had been compulsorily buried in distant military cemeteries. 
 
Whilst the British successfully resisted campaigns for the repatriation of the war dead, 
French and American governments yielded to popular pressure, though for different reasons. 
In November 1918, the French had prohibited the exhumation of the war dead for three years, 
arguing that it would inhibit vital reconstruction work and the construction of official military 
cemeteries. A public campaign waged as grieving relatives sought to recover their sons and 
husbands from temporary battlefield graves (Winter, 1995).  In September 1920, the French 
government agreed to fund the cost of exhumation and transport, though the process was 
delayed until summer 1922 when, of the 700,000 identified corpses, 240,000 were removed 
from battlefield cemeteries. Of the major combatants, France had suffered the highest 
mortality (3.4% of the total population compared with 1.6% for the UK), greatest physical 
destruction, and plausibly experienced the greatest moral injury. 
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During the conflict, American families had been promised the option of repatriation 
but in the aftermath General John J. Pershing and Theodore Roosevelt argued that US dead 
should remain in France to mark the scale of the nation’s contribution. Determined lobbying 
by families, many of whom could not afford to travel to Europe, ensured that choice was 
honored, though repatriation was delayed until 1921. Eventually, 70 per cent of those 
servicemen who had died overseas were returned to the US for burial with over 30,000 
remaining in military cemeteries overseas (Budreau, 2008, pp. 372, 378). A similar policy 
operated in World War II with 171,000 of the 280,000 identified remains being exhumed and 
transported to America. In March 1929, Congress enacted legislation to fund officially 
organized pilgrimages for mothers and widows to Europe, so that they could visit the graves 
of their sons or husbands buried in military cemeteries. Of the 30,000 people contacted, just 
over 6,000 made the journey between 1930 and October 1933 at a cost of over $5 million. 
The Gold Star Association had argued that the strength of the bond between a mother and her 
son justified federal aid, though Congress widened eligibility to widows.  
  
Transformation of traumatic memory 
The 1920s saw veterans and their families struggle to come to terms with the experience of 
war, whilst writers, poets and film-makers began to address the issue of traumatic memory. 
The publication in 1929 of Erich Remarque’s best-selling novel, All Quiet on the Western 
Front, appeared to encapsulate the prevailing mood. However, the legitimacy of this narrative 
was questioned by other veterans. Although conscripted into an infantry regiment, Remarque 
had served only briefly in the trenches. Charles Carrington, an infantry officer, wrote “the 
back-area accounts of soldiers at the base were true to life and sometimes powerfully 
depicted, but the nearer the characters came to the front the more did critical readers doubt 
whether the author had ever been there” (Carrington, 1965, p. 264). Carrington believed that 
the increasing popularity of literature that cast World War I in terms of waste and futility was 
related to the distress caused by the global economic depression. Civilians and veterans 
facing unemployment and loss of savings and homes attributed their plight to the long-term 
effects of the conflict. Observing this mutation of traumatic memory, John Hay Beith, a 
decorated infantry officer who wrote under the pseudonym of Ian Hay, observed “war has 
become a monstrous, unspeakable thing” and cautioned that “our reactions and emotions… 
are too fluid to have any lasting value. We must leave it to time to crystalize them” (Hay, 
1931, pp. 2, 152).  
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 The impact of the 1929 economic depression may be viewed in two ways. Either it 
weakened the argument that the colossal casualties of World War I were justified by the 
conditions of the subsequence peace, or it gave licence to veterans who had suffered moral 
injury but felt unable to express their beliefs until the euphoria of victory has passed. 
 
Traumatic memory in the context of subsequent conflicts 
The reinterpretation of World War I as a futile waste of lives did not prevent young men from 
joining British armed forces in the late 1930s. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force had 
no difficulty finding recruits and, though the British Army often struggled to fill the ranks of 
the infantry, this was as much about pay and conditions as memories of the trenches. By 
September 1939, when war was declared, the British Army numbered 892,700 of whom only 
34,500 were conscripted Militiamen, whilst 438,100 were Territorials, all of whom had 
volunteered (French, 2000, pp. 63-64). Indeed, the anti-war poet Robert Graves attempted to 
re-enlist in 1939, whilst two daughters from his first marriage joined the Women’s Auxiliary 
Air Force and his son, David, served with distinction in the infantry.  
 
Although the British volunteered in their thousands on the outbreak of World War II, 
it was not with the sense of adventure and enthusiasm witnessed in 1914 (Calder, 1969). 
Widespread knowledge of the reality of combat led to a resigned acceptance but no mass 
anti-war protests. In November 1939 the government cancelled the public commemoration of 
Armistice Day (Gregory, 1994). Sirens, now employed to warn of an air-raid, could no longer 
be used to mark the two-minute silence and the assembly of large crowds was discouraged. 
The suspension of Armistice Day ritual was also a symbolic gesture. The dominant emotional 
model for a nation again at war was “stiff upper lip” and the space for the expression of moral 
injury was restricted.  
 
 Because of its scale, World War I created a formal model of grieving and 
commemoration that was adopted in subsequent conflicts. The names of those killed or 
missing in World War II were added to the existing memorials and Armistice Day, though 
tied to November 11, was reformulated to include the dead of subsequent conflicts. No new 
unknown soldier was interred, while UK servicemen killed in action continued to be buried in 
standardized battlefield cemeteries until the Falklands War of 1981. In the aftermath of the 
conflict, the families of 16 servicemen chose to have their sons buried on the island, whilst 64 
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bodies were brought home, the result of a campaign by relatives to be granted the option of 
repatriation. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Traumatic memory is transmitted from one generation to the next in a variety of ways 
including literature (memoirs, novels and poems), film, memorials and commemorative 
rituals, as well as formal teaching in schools. Nations need time after wars to mourn their 
dead and evaluate whether the costs were proportionate to the initial threat and outcome. 
These are both political and emotional issues. Hence, traumatic memory is not simply about 
the feelings of veterans and their close families. Society as a whole takes a view. In the 
1930s, most Britons who bought a poppy, stood in silence on Armistice Day or voted for 
policy of appeasement had not lost a close relative in World War I, though they would 
certainly have known someone who had been killed or wounded. Traumatic memory 
responds to cultural undercurrents and is shaped by events. Moral wounds of war arise should 
a veteran feel that the conflict itself was unjustified or that its conduct violated deeply-held 
beliefs about just behavior. Cultural evidence in the form of novels, memoirs, poems and film 
suggested that a growing number of veterans experienced moral wounds as the costs were 
counted and the global economy faltered. Memorials and rituals designed to contain 
traumatic memory could not address the ethical dilemmas faced by ex-service personnel and 
may even have accentuated them by serving as enduring reminders of loss. World War II was 
associated with a different narrative: a justification founded on a need to defeat fascist states 
engaged in racist persecution. Traditional commemorative rituals were supplemented by 
welfare programmes organized in part to offset the physical and emotional demands of the 
conflict. The psychological casualties of Afghanistan and Iraq will evolve not only in 
response to the development of treatments but also to the way in which these conflicts are 
perceived to have impacted on international politics.  
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